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AUToMATIc FUEL ADJUSTMENT
CLAUSES: TIME FOR A HEARING
Marshall A. Leaffer*
Through automatic fuel adjustment clauses, utilities in most states are permitted
automaticaly to pass through to customers any increase in fuel costs, thereby cir-
cumventing a general rate hearing before a public utilities commission where the
validity of any such rate increase could be publicly examined In this Article the
author discusses the benets and detriments of the automaticfuel adjustment clause,
using the clause that existed in Ohio until quite recently as an example. He con-
cludes that such a rate increase without a hearing can no longer bejustofed on the
basis of uncontrollablefuel costs. Instead he advocates adoption of a hearing con-
tingencyformat, as recentmlproposed by Ohio's House Bill 21, to ensure that utilities
areprovided with adequate incentivesfor efciency in theprocurement and utilization
offuel. He concludes with a discussion of the Ohio provisions as enacted
INTRODUCTION
THE GREATEST expense in the operation of an electric utilityis the cost of fuel, and in recent years it has also been the most
volatile.' In 1973, utility fuel costs totaled $6.7 billion.2 By 1974,
this figure had ballooned to $11.8 billion.3 New safety standards 4
and wage settlements in the coal industry, activities of the OPEC
cartel, and increased consumer demand all contributed to these
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo; B.A. (1964), University of
Texas; M.A. (1968), University of Illinois; J.D. (1971), University of Texas; L.L.M. (1977),
New York University.
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Michael Zugelder, third year
student at the University of Toledo College of Law, in the preparation of this Article.
1. Lindsay, Automatic Adjustment Clauses as a Means for Improving Regulations, in
ADAPTING REGULATION TO SHORTAGES, CURTAILMENT, AND INFLATION 73 (J. O'Donnell
ed. 1977).
2. Id
3. Id Corresponding to the increased costs to utilities, in 1974 consumers realized
$9.6 billion in gas and electric rate increases. During 1974 consumers paid more than one
and one-half times as much in utility rate increases as they did over the previous quarter
century; an estimated two-thirds of these increases resulted from higher fuel costs passed
through to consumers by fuel adjustment clauses. D. JONES & S. DOVELL, ELECTRIC AND
GAS UTILITY RATE AND FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE INCREASES, 1974, prepared for the
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and the Subcommittee on Reports, Ac-
counting and Management of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. V (1975).
4. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. 1979).
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inflated costs.' Although the right of a public utility to recover its
increased fuel costs through rate hikes to the consumer is beyond
dispute,6 controversy centers around the mechanism to be utilized
for this recovery.
Ordinarily, reasonable costs incurred by a public utility are
passed on to the consumer after a general rate hearing before a
public service commission which establishes rates based on costs
of production and return on investment. The goal of the hearing
is to assure that prices charged are comparable to those of other
businesses which operate under the same competitive conditions
and experience similar risks.7 The commission is faced with a dif-
ficult task: simulating market conditions for a regulated monop-
oly while preventing the misallocation of scarce resources. s If the
price established is higher than the competitive market price,
some consumers either will be unable to purchase the service, or
will have less money to spend for other goods and services. If the
price established is lower than the competitive market price, con-
sumers will be encouraged to use a scarce resource which they
would not ordinarily buy at the competitive price, causing a misal-
location of resources.9
During periods of relative price stability, this regulatory task is
fairly easy to accomplish. The task is much harder, however, in
times of rapid cost fluctuation. It is then that the time-consuming
regulatory process, plagued by bureaucratic and administrative
delay, creates situations in which rates may fluctuate between ex-
cessive and insufficient levels."0 In these times of rapidly increas-
5. G.R. Dreese Assoc., Inc., Factors Affecting the Abolishment of the Fuel Cost Ad-
justment Clause for Ohio Electric Utilities, pt. III (May 21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Dreese].
6. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). See note 54 infra and accom-
panying text. Utilities should be given the opportunity to earn a fair rate of return, defined
as one which is just and reasonable, both to investors and to customers, and which is suffi-
cient to enable the company to operate successfully, maintain its financial integrity, attract
capital, and compensate investors for the risks assumed. 320 U.S. at 605; Lindsay, supra
note 1, at 72. For comprehensive treatments of public utility economics and rate making,
see J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); P. GARFIELD & W.
LovaJoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS (1964); 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULA-
TION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1971); C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULA-
TION (1969).
7. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 107.
8. Lindsay, supra note 1, at 71.
9. Id
10. See Lynchburg Gas Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 33, 35-36, add' opinion sub. nor., Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 108 (Va. Div. of Pub. Util. State Corp. Comm'n 1954), ajf'd
sub noz., City of Norfolk v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955);
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ing fuel costs, it has become apparent that regulatory lag may
cause serious cash flow problems for the utility, further decreasing
its earnings, lowering the rate of return on its investments, and
negatively affecting the price of its stock." These consequences,
in turn, damage the company's credit rating, ultimately affecting
its ability to raise necessary capital in the debt market. 12 Lower
bond ratings then lead to higher utility prices as the increased cost
of long term debt filters through the company's financial structure,
finally appearing on its rate schedule.' 3 This increase in the cost
of capital has also forced some utilities to stop paying dividends
which, again, is reflected in lower stock prices.' 4
Hence, it becomes clear that without some method of eliminat-
ing regulatory lag and permitting a rapid fuel cost recovery, a util-
ity will not be able to earn its fair rate of return, especially during
inflationary periods.' 5 Moreover, this low rate of return, coupled
with the restricted availability of capital in the bond market, will
lead to the postponement or cancellation of needed construction
projects, thus creating an era of rationing, extreme price increases,
or simple unavailability.16
The automatic fuel adjustment clause (FAC), which passes an
electric utility's cost of fuel through to the consumer without a
formal public hearing, appears to solve the cash flow dilemma re-
sulting from regulatory lag and eliminates the public expense of
lengthy administrative hearings.' 7 Yet, there are serious criticisms
of a mechanism which permits the automatic pass-through of fuel
costs and creates little incentive for utilities to minimize these
costs. With coal prices likely to stabilize in the future, it is time to
Trigg, Escalator Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 964, 964
(1958).
11. Quigley, Comment, in ADAPTING REGULATIONS TO SHORTAGES, CURTAILMENT,
AND INFLATION 83-84 (J. O'Donnell ed. 1977).
12. Carver, Developments in Regulation." Adjustment Clauses, 53 DEN. L.J. 663, 679-80
(1976). See also Grigg, Regulatory Lag Currently, 99 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 13 (June 23, 1977).
13. Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 120-21 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); An
Explanation: Rising Fuel Costs and the Fuel Adjustment Clauses Used by Seven Electric
Utilities, prepared for the Ohio Electric Utility Institute and distributed to the Joint Select
Committee on Energy, as part of the testimony of Bruce Mansfield 4 (May 8, 1975), citedin
Public Utilities of Ohio and Ohio State University, The Fuel Adjustment Clause 5 (Oct.
1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 PUCO Report].
14. Quigley, supra note 11, at 84; Grigg, supra note 12, at 14.
15. Lindsay, supra note 1, at 73-75.
16. Shiffel, Electric Utility Regulatioir An Overview ofFuel Adjustment Clauses, 95
PUB. UTL. FORT. 23, 25 (June 19, 1975).
17. Trigg, supra note 10.
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reevaluate the automatic fuel adjustment clause for electric utili-
ties.
The Ohio General Assembly has recently performed such an
evaluation and has moved to abolish Ohio's automatic FAC and
replace it with a hearing contingency format. 18 The new format,
although still considered a fuel adjustment clause, does not permit
electric utilities to automatically pass through their increased fuel
costs to their customers. Instead, a fuel cost adjustment hearing
will take place semiannually, separate from the general rate hear-
ing.
In discussing the automatic adjustment clause, this Article will
focus particularly on Ohio's experience in switching from an auto-
matic fuel adjustment clause to a hearing contingency format.
The concerns which led the Ohio legislature to abandon the auto-
matic FAC may well be typical of issues currently facing legisla-
tures in the thirty-one other states which presently have them.
I. THE AUTOMATIC FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE
An automatic adjustment clause (AAC) is a provision in a util-
ity company's rate schedule which allows the company to raise or
lower rates in response to changes in one or more elements of cost
without a full public rate hearing.19 The particular cost item is
thus automatically reflected in rates charged to consumers. In ec-
onomic terms, an AAC is a form of indexation designed to
counter the effects of inflation.20 When cost increases are frequent
and precipitous, the automatic adjustment clause adjusts rates
quickly, thereby circumventing the time-consuming procedures
associated with rate making.2' Sometimes called an escalator
clause, the AAC does not, however, adjust rates upward only, but
also adjusts them downward during periods of decreasing costs.22
An automatic adjustment clause may be used as an economic
and regulatory device for a wide range of cost items such as taxes,
depreciation, and wages, as well as fuel.23 Adjustment clauses
18. Am. Sub. H.B. 21, 113th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1979-80) (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of tit. 49 OHIo REV. CODE ANN.) [hereinafter cited as Final Bill].
19. R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 109-17 (1979).
20. Carver, supra note 12, at 663.
21. Montana Consumer Counsel v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 168 Mont. 180, 184-90, 541
P.2d 770, 773-75 (1975).
22. Trigg, supra note 10, at 966. In this sense, the term escalator clause is a misnomer.
Past use by courts and commissions of the term, as opposed to "automatic" or "fuel adjust-
ment clause," may well be due to the phraseology adopted by Trigg.
23. Id at 982-89. An AAC may be categorized in one of two ways: It may be corn-
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based solely on the fuel costs of electric utilities are called fuel
adjustment clauses, 24 and are by far the most common, far-reach-
ing, and controversial of the automatic adjustment clauses.25
Although the FAC was not a matter of great controversy until
the stakes became high in 1974,26 it is not a new phenomenon in
the history of utility regulation.27 As early as 1917, several state
prehensive, with all cost components subject to automatic adjustment, or it may be limited
to include only some of the cost components. The fuel adjustment clause is an example of
a limited clause. Comprehensive clauses have maximum sensitivity to economic change
but are criticized for failing to provide the utility with incentives to control any of its costs.
R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 19, at 109-1I.
Whether limited or comprehensive, AAC's can be total or partial. A total clause allows
rate changes to reflect the total amount of the cost change, whereas a partial clause allows
only a percentage of cost changes to be passed through. Total clauses are advocated be-
cause they pass along the full costs of input, avoiding cash flow problems for the utility.
Partial clauses, on the other hand, are defended as encouraging efficiency in the acquisition
of inputs. Id
Automatic adjustment clauses for other costs occur separately or accompanying fuel
clauses. For example, tax clauses exist in many states. Critics of these clauses claim that
they are improper because tax liability will not radically fluctuate. Trigg, supra note 10, at
982, 987.
A few states allow a comprehensive pass-through of operational and overhead ex-
penses. One such clause covering increased wages, taxes, depreciation, and other expenses
can be found in New Jersey's telephone rate regulation. Adjustment Clause in Telephone
Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1973). Another even
more comprehensive clause is found in New Mexico. Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113
(N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
24. Adjustment Clauses based on purchased gas costs of gas distributors are called
purchased gas adjustment clauses (PGAC). Ohio, along with 33 other states, has a
purchased gas adjustment clause. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.302 (Page Supp. 1978);
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, State Commission Regulation
and Monitoring of the Fuel Adjustment Clause, Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause, and
Electric and Gas Utility Fuel Procurement Practices, 178-83 (Oct. 27, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as NARUC Study]. The PGAC operates more precisely than the FAC because the
commodity purchased is merely resold without transformation into a different form of en-
ergy. See Foy, Cost Adjustment in Utility Rate Schedules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 663, 670-71
(1960).
25. To present some idea of the scope of the FAC, during 1978 the total fuel cost
recovery under Ohio's FAC was $1,259,215,746. Total fuel cost recovery during 1978 for
all Ohio ultimate consumers was $1,285,086,272. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,
Fuel Cost Recovery Summary and Increases Effected by FCA Calendar Year 1978 (June
20, 1979). The higher figure for total fuel cost recovery reflects the fact that certain fuel
costs are not includable under the FAC. Consideration of these costs must be postponed
until the general rate hearing. For a discussion of includable costs see notes 61-72 infra
and accompanying text.
26. For example, in 1970 Ohio Edison's fuel costs were $41,159,000, which repre-
sented approximately 14.1% of its electric revenues and 40.1% of its operating and mainte-
nance expenses. In 1974 fuel costs totaled $312,320,700, representing 42.9% of electric
revenues and 60.2% of operating and maintenance expenses. Hearings Before the Energy
and Public Utilities Comm., Ohio Senate, Mar. 21, 1979.
27. For the early history of adjustment clauses, see Foy, supra note 24; Trigg, supra
note 10, at 964-68.
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legislatures had added FAC's to electric rate schedules to prevent
financial disaster to utilities resulting from rapidly fluctuating coal
prices.28 Nonetheless, FAC's were generally limited to commer-
cial and industrial users; it was not until recently that they were
extended to residential users.2 9 Today, FAC's are found in some
form in forty-three states and the District of Columbia.3"
II. CRITICISM OF THE AUTOMATIC FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE
Automatic fuel adjustment clauses have engendered much
criticism from consumer groups31 and academic circles.32 The
critics are unpersuaded by the facile justification that FAC's are
nothing more than a mathematical rate adjustment formula for
costs which are completely beyond the utility's control.33 Rather,
FAC's are seen as giving a utility carte blanche to pass through
any fuel cost it wishes, without the discipline of regulatory lag or
administrative review.34 In sum, the FAC produces waste and
inefficiency, encourages the use of fuel intensive technologies at
the expense of other objectives, and hides managerial error.35
28. Alton Gas and Elec. Co. 1917F P.U.R. 12 (Ill. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1917). The
earliest FAC's were provided in response to inflationary fuel costs during World War I.
While a majority of the few cases reported upheld the clauses during this period, a few
post-War cases rejected them. E.g., Plymouth Gas Light Co., 1919A P.U.R. 339 (Mass. Bd.
of Gas & Elec. Light Comm'rs 1918) (clauses too dramatic a departure from standard rate
regulation practices); Rockford Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. 196 (III. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1917)
(such delegation of authority would prevent the commission from knowing the actual price
of coal). Cost increases during World War II brought a new round of demands from utili-
ties for adjustment clauses, but there was no significant reliance on FAC's until the sharp
price increases of the 1970's. Note, Due Process Restraints on the Use ofAutomatic Adjust-
ment Clauses in Utilit Rate Schedules, 18 Apiz. L. REv. 453 (1976).
29. The utilities themselves apparently requested that the early clauses be applicable
only to large customers; it was felt that otherwise the cost of billing would outweigh in-
creased revenues. Trigg, supra note 10, at 974. However, with more efficient billing sys-
tems and rapidly increasing prices, over 70% of the states authorized application of these
clauses to residential users by 1974. Sarikas, What iv New in Adjufstment Clauses, 95 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 32, 33 (June 19, 1975).
30. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 6.
31. See notes 91-92 infra.
32. See Siegel, The Case AgainstAutomatic Adjustment Clauses as a Meansfor Improv-
ing Regulation, in ADAPTING TO SHORTAGES, CURTAILMENTS, AND INFLATION 57 (J.
O'Donnell ed. 1977); notes 1 & 2 supra.
33. One proponent suggests that FAC's "may be viewed as a natural progression in
the move from rate hearings, to rulemaking, to regulation by formula." Schiffel, supra note
16, at 25. He notes, however, that use of FAC's for costs which are controllable by the
company and reasonably stable would be improper. Id at 29.
34. See notes 47-51 infra and accompanying text.
35. These are among the most common criticisms of FAC's. SUBCOMMITTEE OF
STAFF EXPERTS ON ECONOMIcs, NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COM-
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One basic problem of regulation is how to simulate competi-
tion and provide incentives for efficiency within the regulated in-
dustry, which is essentially insulated from competitive conditions,
while preventing the industry from earning supra-competitive
profits.36 The FAC, however, further insulates the utility from the
competitive environment by permitting it to pass through all costs
of fuel immediately. The FAC provides no incentive-and per-
haps creates a disincentive-to bargain hard for a better fuel price
or to find a lower priced supplier.37 Consequently, FAC's may
result in avoidable price escalation for fuel38 as utilities are insu-
lated from normal business risks and allowed to exercise what
amounts to a cost plus privilege to buy expensive fuel without
worrying about shrinking profits.39 This situation is further aggra-
vated when the utility buys its fuel from a subsidiary or affiliated
supplier; here, the utility may readily earn its supra-competitive
profits by buying fuel from the nonregulated subsidiary at artifi-
cally high prices and then passing on these prices to the consumer
through the FAC.40
Because of the FAC's limited nature-the fact that only one
aspect of cost is considered-the goals of the regulatory process
may be harmed in two ways. First, because the FAC focuses only
on the cost of fuel and ignores potentially offsetting savings from
economies of scale, labor and plant productivity, improved tech-
nology, and the like, the consumer may be required to pay a
higher rate based on an incomplete economic analysis. Hence,
those utilities enjoying decreasing costs in other aspects of produc-
tion experience unjustified increased earnings by taking advantage
of the FAC's one input focus.4
The second consequence of the limited nature of the automatic
fuel adjustment clause is that it invites the utility to use excessive
MISSIONERS, AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES REVISED, 120 CONG. REc. 35954 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
36. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 107.
37. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35.
38. Carver, supra note 12, at 681.
39. CONSUMER REPORTS, Nov. 1974, at 839.
40. Id at 837. Captive coal price markups and spot market purchases were chief
abuses found in this area. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35. See notes 116-23 infra
and accompanying text. In this setting both the utility and the affiliated supplier benefit
from the FAC. Note, however, that OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-03 (Banks-Baldwin
1978) was aimed at curbing such abuse.
41. Proponents of the FAC argue that compensating economies are unlikely because,
other than in exceptional economic circumstances, prices generally move in the same direc-
tion during both inflationary or recessive periods. Trigg, supra note 10, at 971.
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fuel intensive technologies while sacrificing capital improvements
which, expensive in the short run, might save fuel in the long
run.42 In the absence of an FAC, a regulated firm may have a
greater tendency to invest in these capital intensive technologies
which inflate the rate base, thereby permitting higher rates and
greater revenues.43 Although never conclusively measured, this
tendency, known as the A-J effect, has been criticized as a distor-
tion resulting from the regulatory process, and defended as so-
cially desirable for providing greater capacity than would be
expected from an unregulated monopoly.' The FAC creates dis-
tortion in quite a different manner, however, by providing incen-
tive to use excessive fuel intensive technologies-essentially
rewarding undercapitalization. The more fuel intensive the pro-
duction process-however wasteful-the less risk borne by share-
holders since the FAC insulates the firm from any impact on
profits which might result from fluctuating fuel CoStS.45 Clearly, in
an age of limited resources, measures which retard the growth of
capital intensive, fuel saving technologies are not to be en-
couraged.46
As stated above, the basic aim of the FAC is to cause prices to
reflect quickly those fluctuations in cost which are beyond a util-
ity's control. The FAC attempts to avoid regulatory lag47 which
may, particularly during periods of inflation, result in a lower rate
42. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 19, at 110.
43. See Averch & Johnson, Behavior ofthe Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). Averch and Johnson demonstrated that a profit maximizing util-
ity would increase its plant investment above the most efficient level and use less of other
inputs such as labor and fuel if it were permitted to earn a rate of return on investment
exceeding the cost of capital. Id
44. Id at 1062; Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An
Empirical Test ofthe Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL. J. EcON. 38 (1974). According to
Kahn, the A-J effect is on the whole beneficial to society because new capital carries with it
risk-taking technological innovation. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 49.
45. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 19, at 110.
46. Schiffel notes that a management interest in increasing the rate base via new capi-
tal improvements serves as a countervailing force to long run use of less efficient fuel and
equipment, but further notes that empirical studies should be made. Schiffel, supra note
16, at 27-28. From all indications, however, there is little reason to believe this offsetting
force occurs. Moreover, many utilities in the 1970's may have experienced rates of return
below the costs of capital. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 19, at 110. Under such circum-
stances, the A-J effect operates in reverse, rewarding undercapitalization and adding to the
input choice distortion likely to be produced by FAC's. Id
47. Regulatory lag can be viewed as having both a substantive and a procedural as-
pect.
The substantive element is the conscious decision to make future rates turn on
past costs. Inevitably, if next year's rates are based on last year's costs rather than
on next year's costs, the rates will always be a year behind. Procedural delay, on
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of return for the utility48 and which, if excessive, may jeopardize
the utility's financial integrity.
Conversely, however, regulatory lag has been considered to
create a positive force on many of the inherent weaknesses of the
regulatory process. 4
9
Freezing rates for the period of the lag imposes penalties for
inefficiency, excessive conservatism, and wrong guesses, and of-
fers rewards for their opposites: companies can for a time keep
the higher profits they reap from a superior performance and
have to suffer the losses from a poor one.50
Regulatory lag thus imposes certain competitive market disci-
plines on a regulated company which might otherwise tend to pad
expenses at no cost or risk to its shareholders.5 1
Regulatory lag thus retains some of the managerial accounta-
bility the FAC would insulate. Although the basic aim of the
FAC is to allow a utility to pass through only those inflationary
costs which are beyond its control, the extent to which any costs
are truly beyond a company's control is debatable. 2 Without the
presence of regulatory lag, which at least for a time imposes the
financial risk of inefficiency on the company's shareholders, a fuel
purchaser will feel little obligation to bargain competitively for
better fuel prices. Although it is true that any regulated fuel pur-
chaser may feel a lesser obligation to bargain competitively over
costs, since even with the benefit of public hearings competitive
prices are not easily determined and purchasing errors are not eas-
ily recognized, it can at least be said that regulatory lag encour-
ages managerial diligence to the extent that the risk of inefficiency
is transferred from the consumer (as is the case under the FAC) to
the shareholders (as is the case at least temporarily during the reg-
ulatory lag period).53
the other hand, is that portion of the total period that is attributable to the sheer
time it takes to process a rate case.
Morgan, Procedural mpediments to OptimalRate Making, in PUBLIC UTILITY RATE MAK-
ING IN AN ENERGY-CONSCIOUS ENVIRONMENT 115, 117 (W. Sichel ed. 1979).
48. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 48; Trigg, supra note 10, at 964.
49. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 48.
50. Id
51. Id Some experts have proposed conscious institutionalized regulatory lag to pro-
vide an even greater incentive for efficiency. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 19, at
119-21.
52. A critical difference between the proponents and the critics of the FAC is the
degree to which they believe utilities have control over the relevant costs. 1975 PUCO
Report, supra note 13, at 12-17.
53. In sum, the FAC encourages "X-inefficiency," described as the failure of manage-
ment in protected situations to pursue production efficiency with much vigor. X-ineffi-
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Apart from these substantial economic criticisms, it may also
be argued that the automatic FAC is an abdication of the regula-
tory process in that it raises rates without a hearing, violating the
consumer's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment.
Except in certain limited circumstances, this due process argument
is essentially groundless. 4 Still, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that the FAC is basically an abdication of regulatory responsibil-
ity and should be regarded as an aberration in the regulatory
process. Consequently, its advocates should bear the burden to
justify its permanent status.
III. THE OHIO FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE
An automatic fuel adjustment clause existed in Ohio until July
2, 1980, when it was replaced by a hearing contingency format.55
Ohio's experience with automatic fuel adjustment may provide a
starting point for analyzing whether the automatic fuel adjustment
ciency is calculated by taking the excess of unnecessary cost as a percentage of actual cost.
W. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization 33 (1979). See also, H. Leiben-
stein, Allocative Efficiency vs. X-inefficiency, 56 AM. ECON. REv. 392 (1966).
Little objective measurement, however, has been undertaken to evaluate the proposi-
tion that regulatory lag plays an important efficiency inducing role. One recent study sug-
gests that X-inefficiency occurs only after fuel clauses are sufficiently liberalized. The study
examined fuel prices in the Northeast, Gulf Coast, and coal belt regions and found X-
inefficiency first appearing in 1971, the year fuel clauses were widely introduced and their
customer coverage greatly extended. By holding output and all input prices constant, Gol-
lop and Karlson estimated significant mean cost elasticity during this period for the re-
gions. Gollop & Karlson, The Impact of the Fuel Adjustment Mechanism on Economic
Efficiency, 60 REv. ECON. & STAT. 574, 583 (1978). One interesting finding of the study
was that there appeared to be no observable X-inefficiency in the Gulf Coast region. The
authors speculate that continual monitoring of the fuel clause which is common throughout
the region has prevented inefficient behavior. Id
54. Although the Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on the consumer's right to
a hearing before rates are increased via an FAC, it has long been held that utilities are
entitled to a reasonable rate of return. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Note, Due Process and the Automatic Fuel
Adjustment Clause, 52 IND. L.J. 637 (1977); Note, supra note 28. One federal district court
has recently ruled that consumers are not entitled to any particular utility rate and have no
vested rights in any fixed utility rates. Sellers v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 372 F. Supp.
1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974). At least two state supreme courts have held that increases charged
in accordance with previously approved automatic FAC's did not violate the consumer's
right to a prior hearing. The state agency's initial approval of the FAC formula was seen as
satisfying the hearing requirement because the FAC was merely a fixed rule or mathemati-
cal formula under which future rates would be calculated. City of Norfolk v. Virginia Elec.
and Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955); City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 13 Ill. 2d 607, 150 N.E.2d 776 (1958).
55. See Final Bill, supra note 18. The bill was signed by Governor Rhodes on April 2,
1980, and took effect ninety days later, on July 2, 1980. The Plain Dealer, Apr. 3, 1980, at
15-A, col. 1.
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clause in general has outlived its usefulness. If a strong case can
be made for the abolition of the FAC in Ohio, it is perhaps not too
great a leap to conclude that the entire concept of an automatic
FAC is essentially flawed and that it should, therefore, be abol-
ished in other states as well. This becomes clear when comparison
of Ohio's automatic FAC with those of other states reveals the
Ohio clause to have been more restrictive than many in its recov-
ery of fuel costs, as well as more ambitious in its attempts to en-
courage efficiency. Moreover, the Ohio clause required as
rigorous and extensive a formal review procedure as may be
found in any state, with central difficulty resulting from the almost
impossible regulatory task of monitoring the operation of the
clause.
A. Design and Structure
Prior to 1976, Ohio had no uniform mechanism for passing
through increases in the cost of fuel. Pre-1976 FAC's were estab-
lished independently by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
(PUCO) and incorporated municipalities during formal rate set-
ting proceedings.5 6 As a result, the FAC's for the eight investor-
owned electric utilities in Ohio varied widely, often differing in
such important aspects as fuel type specifications, base cost of fuel
adjustment, time period for fuel cost adjustment, incremental cost
increase allowed for adjustment, and procedures established for
reporting to PUCO.57
However, in December of 1975, the Ohio General Assembly
passed Amended Substitute House Bill 579,58 which established
more rigorous standards for PUCO review and monitoring of
FAC's. The law also provided PUCO with the authority to pro-
mulgate rules to establish a uniform fuel adjustment clause that
would bring all electric utilities in Ohio within its jurisdiction.59
On March 1, 1976, PUCO promulgated such a rule which, until
recently, was codified as Chapter 4909-1-11 of the Ohio Adminis-
56. 1975 PUCO Report, supra note 13, app. A.
57. Id
58. 1975 Ohio Laws (codified in scattered sections of OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 49
(Page 1977)) (amended 1980). H.B. 579 was passed as an emergency measure following a
study by a joint committee of the Ohio General Assembly chaired by State Senator
Thomas Carney. Although the Carney Committee found no indication of improper activ-
ity by any Ohio utility, it found the need for a uniform, statewide FAC and a more com-
prehensive PUCO review mechanism. See Duffy, Electric Fuel,4djustment Review in Ohio,
12 AKRON L. REv. 465 (1979).
59. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.69(D) (Page 1977) (amended 1980).
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trative Code.6°
FAC's in all states are expressed as formulas designed to spec-
ify which fuel and related nonfuel costs may be recovered and
Ohio was no exception. 6' The formulas establish a method for
60. OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 4909:1-11-01 to -09 (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed
1980). The FAC provisions, formerly Rule 26 of the Commission's Code of Rules and
Regulations, detailed fuel cost calculations, defined includable cost, described incentives
currently used, and coordinated Ohio's various reporting and review procedures. Id
61. In addition, Ohio incorporated into its formulas its unique "Target Thermal Effi-
ciency" incentive, which reduces costs recoverable under the FAC if the utility fails to meet
a historic efficiency figure measured in terms of net kilowatt-hours generated per million
British thermal units of fossil fuel consumed. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-04 (Banks-
Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980). See notes 144-61 infra and accompanying text. Because
target thermal efficiency has been criticized by both company and consumer groups, it
remains an open question whether PUCO will keep target thermal efficiency or develop
some new mode for encouraging the efficient use and procurement of fuel.
Ohio's FAC provisions were reduced to a formula by PUCO. See Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio, Reference Manual for Rate Case Training Program 109-14 (Dec. 21,
22, 1978).
Allowable Fuel Rate
100 CA (CI - CTEA)
Rate -I X 100
EA El
Allowable fuel rate equals allowable cost to energy ratio, cents per kilowatt-hour
(¢/KWH). Id
Includable Fuel Costs
C, = C + C + Cr - csfr- CC
Includable fuel costs (CI) equals fuel costs associated with generation of power (Cg), in-
cluding fossil, nuclear, and hydroelectric fuel costs, plus purchased power costs (Cp) plus
reconciliation adjustments (Cra), less sales for resale charges (Csfr) and ultimate consumer
sales charges (Cues), both of which represent nonjurisdictional sales. Id
Includable Energy
EI = Eg + Ep - Esr- u.
Includable energy (EI) equals net system generation from fossil, nuclear, and hydroelectric
plants measured at the generator terminals, less electric energy used by the plant, plus
purchased energy (Ep), less sales for resale (Esfr) and ultimate consumer sales (Es). Id
Target Thermal Efficiency Adjustment
CTEA = (l-R) (CI - Cp - Cn) when R<l.0
CTEA = 0 when R>1.0
The target thermal efficiency adjustment (CTEA) is calculated using includable fuel costs
(CI) except for the cost of purchased power (Cp) and nuclear fuel costs (Cn). Further, the
adjustment does not apply when the utility exceeds its target (R>1.0) and thus does not act




The target thermal efficiency ratio (R) equals weighted average of thermal efficiencies over
the prior twelve month period (WATE) divided by the target thermal efficiency (TTE).
WATE = E(prior 12 months)
mmBTU's consumed (prior 12 months)
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computation of these costs and outline a method for passing them
through to the consumer. Cost of fuel is not the only aspect con-
sidered; adjustments for thermal efficiency and taxes are also in-
cluded. Practically all forty-three states still using an FAC differ
on the particular specifications included in the formula. These
variations, often having an economic rationale, are determined by
such factors as the differing utility operational procedures and en-
vironments, as well as differing commission policies. 6 2
The nature of fuel costs included in the fuel adjustment charge
is a principal source of variation among jurisdictions. 63 Gener-
ally, fuel related costs are of three basic varieties: fuel cost itself,
costs related to the purchase of fuel, and nonfuel costs. States
vary, however, in the types of fuel covered by their FAC formulas.
Many states, for example, exclude nuclear fuel and the cost of
purchased energy; Ohio did not.6 4
State formulas also vary in the extent to which costs related to
the purchase of fuel can be passed through to the consumer.65
These costs include transportation expenses, which were included
in Ohio,66 as well as costs of fuel handling after delivery and waste
disposal, which Ohio did not include.67 Other costs which might
be passed through are nonfuel expenses such as state gross receipt,
franchise, and property taxes. 68 None of these taxes was includ-
able under the Ohio statute.69 In Ohio, includable costs encom-
Weighted thermal efficiency, in turn, is found by dividing net system generated power for a
prior month by that month's mmBTU's consumed. These twelve statistics are then aver-
aged for WATE. Id
62. See NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 178-252.
63. Id at 178-83.
64. Id For a discussion of nuclear fuel and purchased energy under Ohio's FAC, see
notes 142-43 & 160-76 infra and accompanying text.
65. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 178-252.
66. OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-01(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
All "direct and justifiable consumed costs" were includable. Id This specifically included
"direct cost of fuel F.O.B. at the plant," which was defined as "the sum of the delivery cost
and the acquisition cost of the fuel consumed .. " Id §§ 4901:1-11-01(D), -02(E). De-
livery cost generally meant "the cost of delivery of fuel to be used for the generation of
electricity. ... I (d § 4901:1-11-01(D). But, for a company-owned fuel supply, delivery
cost was specifically excluded. Id § 4901:1-11-02(C).
67. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-02(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
As a general proposition, the FAC is designed to pass through costs which are particularly
volatile. Fuel handling expenses do not fluctuate to the same degree as, for example, fuel
transportation costs and as a result are often excluded from FAC's. NARUC Study, supra
note 24, at 148.
68. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 178-83.
69. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE §4901:1-11-01(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed
1980).
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passed direct cost of fuel F.O.B. at the plant plus fuel costs
attributable to purchased power.70 On the other hand, fuel
charges attributable to power generated for resale or for consumer
sales outside of PUCO's jurisdiction were required to be deducted
from includable fuel charges.7 Also excluded were such costs as
gross receipt taxes, line losses, and fuel handling costs. 72
Under the Ohio FAC, all costs were historical in nature, that
is, costs passed through represented either the actual cost or an
estimate of actual cost with an adjustment as the cost informa-
tion became available.73 PUCO also required each consumer's
monthly statement to indicate conspicuously and clearly individ-
ual, total fuel charges.74
B. Review and Monitoring
Perhaps even more important than design and structure of the
FAC is the extent to which its application is reviewed and moni-
tored by the relevant regulatory authority. Through review and
monitoring procedures, the regulatory authority must decide
whether the utilities have complied with a complicated statute and
complex set of administrative rules. But even the best-intentioned
commission, working under an ideal set of rules, is limited by its
own resources. Commissions are chronically understaffed and
turnover is often great, rendering ineffective the administrative
task of overseeing the tangled web of fuel procurement and con-
sumption practices. The automatic fuel adjustment clause com-
pounds the difficulty of this task, largely because inadequate
administrative resources are applied to a range of business trans-
actions which have already occurred and must be reconstructed
70. Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 56 Ohio St. 2d 319, 384 N.E.2d 245
(1978); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-01(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980). See
also note 64 supra.
71. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-01(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
72. See id. §§ 4901:1-11-01 to -02. However, where power was purchased, line losses
were includable provided the requirements of "economic dispatch" were met in the
purchase of that power. These requirements were met if the total cost of power purchased
was less than the cost at which the buyer could have generated power at the time of the
purchase. Id § 4901:1-11-02(I).
73. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 4901:1-11-01 to -02 (Banks-Baldwin 1978)(repealed
1980); Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, supra note 61, at 108. Use of a future cost
basis has several drawbacks: cost uncertainty can be a cover-up for rubberstamping by a
commission, and the elimination of regulatory lag reduces incentives for efficiency. See
text accompanying notes 36-40 supra; Note, supra note 28, at 458.
74. OHIO ADMIN. CODE §4901:1-11-08 (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
Under prior practice, a portion of the fuel charge had been included in the utilities' rate
base.
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from company-supplied data. A review of many state FAC's
reveals a variety of monitoring and review practices designed to
accomplish this almost impossible regulatory task.1
In general, FAC's may be categorized as automatic or nonau-
tomatic, depending upon whether a formal hearing is held before
or after a utility asks for modification of its adjustment surcharge.
A fuel clause is automatic if the adjustment charge is passed
through to the consumer without a formal hearing, which consists
of notice and formal testimony, and results in an order issued by
the commission. Nonautomatic hearing contingency clauses are
found in thirteen states.76 This is the format that has recently
been adopted in Ohio.77
In thirty-one states regulatory commissions permit an auto-
matic FAC which enables the utility to pass on a fuel surcharge
without a hearing.78 But even in these states, review procedures
vary. Review of the FAC might range from routine checks of
FAC calculations and spot checks of electric generating plants, to
full scale audits of the utility's fuel purchases and full investigative
hearings concerning the structure and design of the fuel adjust-
ment clause.79
In comparison with other state statutes, the former Ohio provi-
sions required fairly rigorous review procedures consisting of
monthly reports, 8° semi-annual hearings, 8 and annual financial
and performance audits to determine reasonable and proper
costs.82 If the Commission decided that charges were improper, it
had the authority to order an adjustment or refund, and did, in
75. See generally NARUC Study, supra note 24.
76. Id at 38.
77. See Final Bill, upra note 18. For a discussion of this legislation and an earlier
version of the bill, see notes 177-221 infra and accompanying text.
In 1974, most states having FAC's had the automatic type; at that time only four states
(California, Florida, New Jersey, and Wyoming) required hearings. Recently there ap-
pears to be a retreat from the automatic clause toward a hearing contingency format. D.
JONES & S. DOVELL, supra note 3, at 4. The following states have recently abolished or
greatly modified their FAC's: Georgia, Georgia Power Co., File No. 19314, Docket No.
312-U (Nov. 1, 1978); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-134(e) (Supp. 1977); Vir-
ginia, VA. CODE §§ 56-235 (Supp. 1979); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 24-2-4(a) (Supp.
1979).
78. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 38, 178-82.
79. Id at 36-38.
80. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.66(A)(3) (Page 1977) (amended 1980).
81. Id § 4905.30 1(B). At these hearings, each utility had the burden of proving that
its fuel adjustment charges were fair, just, and reasonable. Id § 4909.191.
82. Id § 4905.66(A), (B)(2).
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fact, exercise this authority. 83
Specifically, Ohio law required PUCO to be responsible for
periodic monitoring of the fuel procurement practices of electric
utilities.84 Accordingly, Ohio's eight investor-owned utilities sub-
mitted monthly reports of their fuel costs to PUCO.85 The Com-
mission had thirty days to determine if acquisition and delivery
costs had been erroneously reported.86 This was accomplished by
verifying the mathematical accuracy of cost calculations passed
through to consumers.87 In addition, electric companies were
required to participate in semi-annual hearings to determine
whether all fuel costs passed through during that period were rea-
sonable and fair.88 One of these semi-annual public hearings took
place within one month after completion of the electric utility's
annual audit, to consider matters raised in the audit and the effi-
ciency of the utility's fuel acquisition and utilization practices.89
The second of these hearings was held to assure constant review of
the utility's fuel costs." The hearing process involved cross-exam-
ination of utility witnesses by representatives of various consumer
organizations. The Office of Consumer's Counsel (O.C.C.) partic-
ipated extensively and, by statutory authority, represented the res-
idential consumer before the Commission.91 The O.C.C. placed
high priority on FAC hearing participation, and spoke vigorously
83. Id § 4909.191(D). This section provided for refunds due to errors in reporting,
unreasonable fuel procurement practices, errors in estimation of kilowatt-hours sold, or to
further Commission policies.
Reconciliation adjustment is an adjustment to the amount of money an electric com-
pany has passed through its fuel clause. If, after reviewing a company's fuel charge, the
Commission determined that the company had not recovered enough money to cover its
fuel costs, it ordered an adjustment in the company's favor. Conversely, if the Commission
found that the company had recovered more than it should through the fuel clause, it
ordered a refund to the consumer. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-02(Q) (Banks-
Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980). In 1978, the Commission ordered $9,802,051 in refunds;
for the years 1976-79, the Commission ordered refunds of $23,919,407. Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio, Annual Summary of Consumer Refunds in the Form of Rate Recon-
ciliation Adjustments Caused by the Existence of Fuel Cost Adjustment Rates Under
Chapter 4901:1-11 Ohio Administrative Code 1976-79, at 7, 8 (June 19, 1979).
84. OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 4905.66(B)(1), (2), § 4905.301(B) (Page 1977) (amended
1980).
85. Id § 4905.66(A)(3).
86. Id § 4905.66(B)(1), (E)(1).
87. Id § 4905.66(E)(2).
88. Id § 4909.191(B), (C).
89. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-06(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
90. Id
91. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4911 (Page 1977).
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for the abolition of Ohio's automatic fuel adjustment clause.92
An additional monitoring and review procedure under Ohio's
former FAC required utilities to submit yearly financial and per-
formance audits of their fuel practices within one month of the
filing of the annual report.9 3 The audit, unless otherwise ordered
by the Commission, was permitted to be conducted by an in-
dependent auditing firm and costs were borne by the electric com-
pany.94 This audit, critical to the review procedure, was designed
to determine if minimum prices had been paid for purchased fuel
and whether long term fuel supplies would be obtainable at rea-
sonable prices.95
1. Independent Auditors
It is easy to say that any audit program is only as reliable as
the objectivity of the auditing firm. The audits by "independent"
firms, however, have become controversial in the context of fuel
adjustment clauses-both automatic and contingent. Their true
independence was questioned in Ohio because electric companies
paid for their own audits and selected auditors subject to Commis-
sion approval.96 Even more questionable, some companies had
chosen their own financial auditor to perform the FAC audit.97
Because of doubt surrounding the objectivity of the audits, critics
find it more than coincidental that an overwhelming number of
these audit results recommended reconciliation adjustments for
92. The O.C.C. was created in 1976 as part of regulatory reform legislation following
the Carney Committee report discussed at note 58 supra. O.C.C. is unique in that it oper-
ates under a citizens governing board. Its several divisions have been involved in the major
Ohio utility rate cases and have provided active representation in the FAC hearings. Since
its creation, O.C.C. has been a party to most of the semi-annual hearings and several audit
hearings before PUCO. Other activities include complaint cases, studies (including a statu-
torily-mandated study of PUCO), drafting of proposed legislation, and federal case inter-
vention.
In 1978, O.C.C. commissioned Touche, Ross and Co. to study Ohio's FAC. The study
concluded that the FAC should be abolished. Touche, Ross and Co., Office of Consumers'
Counsel of The State of Ohio-Review and Analysis of the Ohio Fuel Cost Adjustment
Clause, July 21, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Touche Ross Study]. Besides advocating the
Ohio FAC's abolition, O.C.C. has contested the major FAC issues of purchased power,
captive coal, and thermal efficiency. See Goodman, The Role of Consumer Advocacy
Before the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 8 CAP. L. REv. 213 (1978).
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.66(B)(2) (Page 1977) (amended 1980); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-06(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
94. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-06(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
95. Id
96. Goodman, supra note 92, at 237.
97. Id
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the company.98
Since the 1975 changes in FAC review,99 PUCO has never
conducted its own fuel audits.' 0 Consequently, in Dayton Power
andLight,1°0 the question of sufficient independence arose in con-
nection with $900,000 in payments by the utility to Arthur Ander-
sen & Co. for work done by the firm. Testimony for Dayton
Power and Light advocating rate increases was given by the same
Arthur Andersen employee who performed the audit. Moreover,
it was pointed out that Arthur Andersen maintained space in Day-
ton Power and Light's office building and paid rent to the utility.
The Commission ruled, however, that the independence of an au-
ditor will be presumed and that the intervenors had not rebutted
that presumption. The question still remains whether an auditing
firm in that position should be allowed to repeatedly conduct
these audits, as was the case under the Ohio FAC. Although the
Ohio General Assembly had the opportunity to remedy the appar-
ent lack of independence in the automatic FAC audit, when it was
changed to a hearing contingency format, provisions strengthen-
ing the audit system were apparently rejected on the Senate
floor. 102
Even assuming the objectivity of the auditing firm, the result
of any review procedure is thrown into doubt when the data to be
measured is of questionable reliability or uniformity, as is, for ex-
ample, the data derived from purchased power transactions. In
addition, review procedures are effective only if the data investi-
gated is subject to precise determination, as in the evaluation of
coal procurement and contract shortfalls.
98. Touche Ross Study, supra note 92, at 111-31. The study found that 90% of audi-
tors' findings recommended adjustments for the company.
According to Stevenson, independent evaluation of the utility's managerial structure
and operating procedures can provide useful identification of those areas susceptible to cost
reduction. To assure objectivity, he argues that the group conducting the audit should be
chosen by the Commission and report its findings directly. R. STEVENSON, PRODUCTIVITY
IN THE PRIVATE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 205 (1978). See also, Office of Consumers'
Counsel, Major Abuses of the Fuel Adjustment Clause (1979).
99. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
100. Goodman, supra note 92, at 231. Thirty-seven state commissions have their own
staffs conduct fuel cost audits. Ohio-both under its FAC and under its new contingency
format-is one of three jurisdictions that rely exclusively on outside consultants for the
audit. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 211-16.
101. No. 77-374-EL-FAC 3-4 (PUCO, Oct. 19, 1977).
102. Compare Am. Sub. H.B. 21, 113th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess.
4905.66(B)(2) (1979-80) (as reported by Senate committee) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Version] with Final Bill, supra note 18, at § 4905.66(B)(2). See note 219 infra and accom-
panying text.
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2. Contract Monitoring and the Shortfall Problem
The Ohio Commission also came under attack for its monitor-
ing of coal procurement practices; in particular, criticism focused
on the frequent and serious contract shortfalls experienced by util-
ities in their coal supply contracts. 103 To obtain a reliable supply
of coal at a minimum price, electric companies usually maintain a
long term coal contract with a supplier unless the company owns
its own captive sources. If a supplier fails to meet contract terms,
the utility is forced to buy coal on the spot or open market. These
spot market purchases are frequently more expensive than coal
purchases made under a long term contract. The O.C.C. and
other critics have faulted utility companies for laxity in enforcing
their long term contracts."°
Solution of this problem remains difficult, since most long-
standing coal contracts have aforce maeure provision-an excul-
patory clause exonerating the coal company from liability for
nonperformance of its contract in cases of governmental action,
acts of war, or strikes. Many contract shortfalls are attributed to
new federal environmental and safety legislation which has re-
sulted in a decline in productivity."5 Because these situations fall
within the force majeure provisions of the contracts, few compa-
103. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.69(D) (Page 1977) (amended 1980) provided that
PUCO promulgate a rule excluding fuel costs arising from unfulfilled contracts with sup-
pliers or unreasonable purchase arrangements between the utility and its captive subsidi-
ary. Pursuant to that authority, OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-07(A)(2) (Banks-Baldwin
1978) (repealed 1980) provided that PUCO should not permit recovery unless the utility
made efforts to obtain contract performance or damages for nonperformance. See Toledo
Edison, 76-531-EL-FAC 12 (PUCO, Jan. 26, 1977).
The importance of this problem is evident from the fact that 90% of Ohio electricity is
produced by burning coal and that in 1977 approximately 68% of the coal delivered to
Ohio utilities was obtained under long term contract. Battelle Columbus Laboratories,
Final Report on Technical Economic Research on Ohio Electric Utility Coal Procurement
and Prices to Touche, Ross & Co. for Office of Consumers' Counsel, 1-3 (Oct. 30, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Battelle Report].
104. O.C.C. often urged that PUCO should require utilities to enforce their contracts
with suppliers and limit use of the spot market purchases. Related O.C.C. criticisms in-
cluded the utilities' failures to enforce coal quality requirements, to spread idle mine costs
of affiliated mines, and to use the spot market during default of the supplier where spot
market prices were lower than the contract prices. See Office of Consumers' Counsel,
supra note 98.
105. Ohio Edison experienced quantity shortfalls of 937,000 tons and quality shortfalls
of 425,000 out of 6.3 million tons ordered under twelve contracts in effect between April 1,
1976, and March 31, 1977. Ohio Edison attributed these shortfalls to efforts by suppliers to
comply with the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 801-962 (Supp.
1979). Ohio Edison, No. 77-373-EL-FAC 9-10 (PUCO Oct. 26, 1977).
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nies have brought suit against their coal suppliers. 0 6 The Com-
mission had found this failure to litigate reasonable in light of
justifiable conduct by coal suppliers.10 7
A contract shortfall in Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utility
Commission'08 illustrates the complicated nature of the problem.
In this case, the O.C.C. alleged that the company had overcharged
its customers by accepting inferior quality coal at the full contract
price and passing the cost through to consumers-a violation of
former section 4901:1-11-07(B)(2) of the Ohio Administrative
Code. 09 This section required the Commission to exclude from a
utility's fuel charges any increased costs incurred as a result of
supplier failure to fulfill contract obligations, unless the utility
submitted satisfactory evidence to the Commission of its efforts to
obtain performance or to recover damages for nonperformance."t0
The court rejected the O.C.C.'s contention, stating that business
realities may-excuse the failure to bring suit.' To a large extent,
therefore, the utility may decide whether litigation is in its own
best interest. Here, the record indicated that the coal came from
one of the country's largest coal seams and that the company had
an interest in maintaining an advantageous relationship with the
supplier for future transactions." 2 It also appeared that the par-
ties entered into the agreement suspecting that the coal might fall
106. Some companies, however, have pursued contract shortfalls in the courts. E.g.,
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., No. 78-624-EL-FAC (Subfile A) 4 (PUCO, March 20,
1979).
107. The delicate business judgment that goes into coal contract negotiations is difficult
to assess. For example, Cleveland Electric Illuminating's purchase of coal from one sup-
plier on a long term contract was the most expensive coal it had purchased during the year.
But, according to the Commission, this did not make the contract per se unreasonable.
Other factors must be taken into account, such as the company's opportunity to purchase
less expensive coal at that time on a contractual basis from another source, and whether the
company should have entered into the contract when it did. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., No. 77-373-EL-FAC 13 (PUCO, Dec. 7, 1977).
The Commission tries to assess a range of possible nonperformance justifications. For
example, Ohio Edison experienced substantial quantity and quality shortfalls in its coal
supply contracts. The supplier maintained that it had been excused by the force majeure
provision in the contract. The company claimed that these shortfalls were the result of
wildcat strikes, production shortages because of enforcement of health standards, and un-
loading problems. No reconciliation adjustment was ordered, even though the company
had not brought litigation in two years. The Commission was satisfied that the company
had made up losses on the spot market. Ohio Edison Co., No. 78-622-EL-FAC 13
(PUCO, Oct. 18, 1978).
108. 56 Ohio St. 2d 319, 384 N.E.2d 245 (1978).
109. Id at 325, 384 N.E.2d at 249.
110. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-07(B)(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
111. 56 Ohio St. 2d at 325, 384 N.E.2d at 249.
112. Id.
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below specifications because of the uncertain effect of the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act on mining operations.' 13 In ad-
dition, damages appeared to be minimal." 4 Consequently, the
court held that the utility acted reasonably in deciding not to sue
its supplier, and that the Commission acted reasonably in al-
lowing the utility to pass its costs through to the consumer.
The problem of contract shortfalls will no doubt continue to be
acute. Indeed, Ohio's new contingency format has no provisions
to deal with the problem."t 5 Most major environmental and
health legislation has become an understood portion of coal cost
and it does not appear that this situation will change. Thus, little
can be accomplished through remedial legislation other than re-
quiring the utility to justify its decision not to litigate the nonper-
formance of a contract.
3. Captive Coal Supplies
Another difficult issue in the area of coal use and procurement
is the monitoring and review of captive coal mining transactions.
A captive mining operation consists of utility ownership or
financial interest in a coal mine." 16 Captive mining operations are
widespread in Ohio with twenty-six percent of coal burned in
1976 origiating from captive mines, and with a predicted in-
crease to thirty-six percent by 1985. 17 Five of Ohio's seven major
utilities are involved in these affiliated coal relationships." 8
The number of captive mining operations has increased be-
cause mine ownership assures a predictable source of fuel, con-
tinuity of supply, and consistent quality. Moreover, captive mines
experience less risk than commercial producers because they have
a built-in market for their coal." 19 These nonprice advantages do
not, however, guarantee that the consumer always benefits from
captive coal sources. A report done for the O.C.C. indicates that
113. Id
114. Id
115. See Final Bill, supra note 18.
116. A captive mining operation generally consists of the following: utility ownership
and operation of a coal mine and related facilities directly or through a wholly-owned
subsidiary; utility ownership of reserves and possibly mining equipment with mining done
by the independent mining company; or a financial interest in a coal company, such as a
loan or a loan guarantee. Battelle Report, supra note 103, at 111-3.
117. Id at 1-5 to -7.
118. 1d at 111-15.
119. The advantages of using captive coal supplies are described in Ohio Power, No.
76-534-EL-FAC 7-12 (PUCO, April 4, 1977).
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cost incentives for captive mines exist only so long as output re-
mains constant at the mine's designated capacity.1 21 In times of
production shortfall captive mines are able to charge a higher
price, while the commercial mines are forced to keep prices con-
stant and absorb a lower rate of return during that period.' 2 '
In addition, there is speculation that the utilities have taken
unfair advantage of their captive mine relationships, enabling
them to earn supra-competitive profits and pass improper ex-
penses through to the consumer without a rate hearing.'2 2 For
example, average captive coal prices in the American Electric
Power system from 1973 to 1976 were higher- than spot or long
term contract prices for three of those four years and the quality of
the coal was inferior for all four years. 2 3 Although the use of
captive coal may confer positive consumer benefits, the above
data suggest the need for close monitoring of these transactions.
C. Incentives for Efficiency
One difficult problem facing regulatory authorities is the de-
velopment of effective means for encouraging the protected mo-
nopoly to operate efficiently.2 4 The problem is particularly acute
under the automatic FAC. Even its most ardent supporters agree
120. Battelle Report, supra note 103, at 111-3 to -15.
121. Id
122. Several possible abuses in the calculation of rate of return for captive mines were
pointed out in the Battelle Report. One concern is the utilities' choice to expense capital
expenditures, writing them off immediately, and amortizing them over a period of time.
Neither PUCO nor the SEC has made definitive rulings on these practices. The second
area of potential abuse concerns accruals. Advance payments for some items such as black
lung and other worker benefits may be overestimated by the utilities, thereby giving them-
selves extra operating revenues for a short time. Id at 111-14.
123. Id at 111-21. These figures, however, may be the result of factors that are not
readily apparent. For example, such price comparisons must take into account the date on
which the contract was signed. Contract prices with independents may appear lower than
affiliated coal prices because the price of nonaffiliated coal may include the price of coal
purchased under favorable long term contracts signed when escalation clauses were not
commonplace. They may also be misleading because these same contracts may have been
signed before the advent of the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act, which is generally
acknowledged to have increased costs and decreased production. Ohio Power Co., No.
76-534-EL-FAC 10-11 (PUCO, April 4, 1977).
124. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 107, 121-23. Data confirms the existence of signifi-
cant differences among privately-owned electric utilities in the level of static efficiency at-
tained. Static efficiency involves the use of the best available technologies and the optimal
mix of factor inputs to produce the lowest cost electricity. If static efficiency involves the
best use of existing technologies, dynamic efficiency is concerned with how well the utility
performs over time in actively attempting to reduce cost burden. R. STEVENSON, supra
note 98, at 198.
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that efficiency incentives in the use and procurement of fuel must
be provided.125 State commissions vary on what they consider the
most effective incentives for efficiency and consequently tailor in-
dividual programs that vary widely from one region to another. 26
Variables such as fuel mix, nature of electricity distributed, load
characteristics, environmental requirements, and financial per-
formance may account for differences in the incentive pro-
grams.12 7
Generally, an incentive for efficiency is based on one or more
of the following principles: (1) permitting a utility to recover less
than the full amount of fuel costs; (2) penalizing a utility for fail-
ure to reach an operating goal and rewarding it for exceeding the
goal; or (3) motivating a utility to purchase power when self-gen-
eration becomes more expensive. PUCO was given explicit au-
thority to develop efficiency incentives under the automatic FAC
and this authority continues under the new format. 28
1. Incomplete Recovery
Incomplete recovery may be effected by three means: fixing a
percentage recovery, intentionally inducing a several-month delay
for the pass-through of fuel expenses, or disallowing certain fuel
expenses. Until the adoption of the hearing contingency format,
Ohio had rejected the first two approaches for incomplete recov-
ery and adopted the third.12 9
Only two states, Michigan and South Dakota, have taken the
125. Lindsay, supra note I, at 75-78. At the time of Lindsay's article there were no
studies providing persuasive evidence of economic abuse or disadvantage resulting from
FAC's. He concludes, however, that if future evidence shows FAC's to have reduced in-
centive to minimize costs, created bias in the selection of fuels used, or caused utilities to
ignore savings from other economies, then incentives to correct these side effects would be
warranted. Id
Trigg, considered to be the FAC's most ardent supporter, discounts the economic objec-
tion that FAC's reduce incentives to minimize cost, maintaining that moderate regulatory
lag is usually present with FAC's and the clauses can be designed to pass through some-
what less than the full cost increases paid by utilities. Trigg, supra note 10, at 969.
126. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 139.
127. Id at 140.
128. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.69(D) (Page 1977) (amended 1980); Final Bill,
supra note 18, at § 4905.69(D). The specific incentive provisions of Ohio's FAC included
OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 4901:1-11-01(D), -02(C), (D) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed
1980) (limiting pass-throughs to justifiable "direct" costs); id § 4901:1-11-02(1) (a
purchased power provision allowing cost of power purchased and related nonfuel costs to
be passed through to the extent that they do not exceed in-house operation); and id
§§ 4901:1-1 1-02(S), -04 (target thermal efficiency provision which penalizes the utility for
inefficient operation).
129. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
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first approach, and both allow ninety percent of the cost of fuel to
be recovered under the FAC. 30 Ohio and other states have re-
jected incomplete expense recovery under the FAC, claiming it
would undermine the basic goals of the FAC. Under fixed per-
centage recovery, in times of inflation, the company would still
have cash flow problems, although to a lesser extent. 13  Also, the
two states using the incomplete percentage recovery do not re-
quire the utility to pass cost savings on to the consumer, but allow
the company to keep them. 3 Others have criticized incomplete
recovery, claiming it permits construction of more expensive fuel
plants or overly expensive transmission lines. 133
Imposition of an optimal time lag is another method of incom-
plete recovery. This amounts to the intentional creation of a regu-
latory lag which will presumably penalize inefficiency, partic-
ularly in times of fuel cost increase, because the utility must wait
several months for the cost increases to be reflected in rates
charged to customers. North Carolina and Florida have insti-
tuted, respectively, a two and three month lag. 134 A lag may also
occur through normal business processes. Under Ohio's auto-
matic FAC, where lag was not mandated by statute it took an
electric company an average of ninety days to process the new fuel
costs into the billing system. It is doubtful, however, that a ninety
day de facto lag is long enough to encourage harder fuel price
bargaining. 13  Ohio's new hearing contingency format adopts
what amounts to a six month time lag.' 36
Incomplete recovery can also be effected by disallowing cer-
tain fuel expense items.' 37 Commissions vary in the types of fuel
130. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 21 P.U.R.4th 1 (S.D. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1977) (utility
permitted to increase its percentage recovery from 75% to 90%, which is typical of utilities
in South Dakota); Consumers Power Co., 14 P.U.R. 4th 370 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976) (Commission allowed only 90% recovery as incentive to reduce fuel costs).
These two states have chosen a 90% recovery, but the economic rationale behind the
percentage is unclear. In questioning the logic of percentage recovery under FAC's, Carver
concludes that it is merely a decision to place a share of the burden of fuel cost increases on
the investors. Carver, supra note 12, at 673.
131. Lindsay, supra note 1, at 78. Lindsay would impose a percentage recovery only if
there was evidence that utilities were failing to minimize cost. Otherwise, a percentage
recovery would not be in the public interest. Id
132. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 145-46.
133. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 19, at 111.
134. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 141.
135. Id at 191.
136. See Final Bill, supra note 18, at § 4905.301.
137. This type of incomplete recovery involves the exclusion of certain expenses from
recovery under the FAC. This does not necessarily mean they are never recoverable, but
1980]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4 REVIEW [
and fuel-related expenses allowed under automatic FAC's.
Purchased power is a common exclusion, while in states having
nuclear power plants nuclear expense is invariably includable in
the FAC. 38 A more critical question concerns which nonfuel ex-
penses will be excluded. Ohio, for example, excluded gross re-
ceipts tax and fuel handling expenses, while including fuel
transportation costs. 13 9
It has been noted that regulation has a general tendency to
expand into nonregulated areas. 4° Similarly, prior to the aboli-
tion of the automatic FAC, the trend in Ohio appeared to be to-
ward inclusion of nonfuel expenses in the FAC formula. In
doubtful cases, proposed costs were usually found eligible for
pass-through under the FAC.' 4' Although the Ohio FAC was not
intended to be all-inclusive, favoring incomplete recovery, the
thrust of the Commission's opinions seemed to run in the opposite
direction.
The inclusion of nuclear fuel in the Ohio FAC is an excellent
example of how difficult it is to curtail the scope of the FAC. Al-
though Ohio's FAC was entitled "Fossil Fuel Adjustment
Clause,"' 42 the statute and the rules addressed fuel costs in general
without specifying the types of fuel to be covered. Nevertheless,
the Commission has ruled that a utility could pass acquisition and
consideration is postponed until a general rate hearing. Thus, any changes in the extent of
recovery under the FAC has an effect on future rate base recoveries.
138. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 184-95; Smith & Lancaster, Nuclear Power's
Effect on Electric Rate Making, 101 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 16, 18 (Feb. 2, 1978).
139. See notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text.
140. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 28-32.
141. For example, the Commission has ruled that oil terminal costs from the port of
Lorain were includable fuel costs under the FAC. Ohio Edison Co., No. 77-373-EL-FAC
10-11 (PUCO, Oct. 26, 1977). The oil terminal costs were charges incurred by Ashland
Oil, Ohio Edison's supplier, in operating, maintaining, and leasing oil storage terminals at
the port of Lorain. Ohio Edison was to reimburse Ashland monthly, whether any fuel was
delivered or not. The Commission concluded that such terminal costs were direct costs of
fuel includable under the FAC and not merely storage expenses. Id The Commission has
also ruled that deferred lease charges were part of the acquisition cost of nuclear fuel.
Toledo Edison Co., No. 78-628-EL-FAC 11 (PUCO, Jan. 3, 1979).
One nonfuel cost the Commission did not allow was the pass-through of $223,000 for a
railroad repair loan to repair track from a Cleveland Electric Illuminating (CEI) plant to a
coal mine. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 78-626-EL-FAC 8-9 (PUCO, Dec. 6, 1978).
The Commission ordered a reconciliation adjustment because the charge did not represent
charges incurred directly in the transportation of fuel. Id Although the $223,000 may
have facilitated the transportation of coal from mines to CEI's plant, it is difficult to associ-
ate it directly with the delivery of any particular fuel.
142. OHIO ADMIN. CODF § 4901:1-11 (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
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delivery costs for nuclear fuel through the FAC. 14 3
2. Target Thermal Efficiency
In addition to allowing only incomplete recovery, the Com-
mission has encouraged efficiency by establishing criteria to meas-
ure a company's consumption of fuel and by rewarding those
companies that achieve target efficiency. I"4 Not all companies
convert energy, whether the fossil or nuclear fuel, into electricity
with the same degree of efficiency. Thermal efficiency, or the rate
by which fuel is converted into electricity, is measured by heat
rate and expressed in BTU's required to generate a net kilowatt-
hour of electricity. 4 ' Heat rate, which varies from company to
company, is determined by factors such as type and quality of the
fuel burned, the company's load characteristics, environmental re-
quirements, and the type of generating facilities used. 146 Most
state commissions have used some form of heat rate calculation to
reward thermal efficiency. 4 7 Under its automatic clause, Ohio
took a unique approach using a variable heat rate and a target
thermal measure of efficiency.
148
143. Application of the FAC to nuclear power requires special consideration because
the cost of uranium is stable over long periods of time. The uranium itself constitutes only
31% of the "nuclear fuel cycle," which involves conversion and reprocessing cycles ex-
tending over a number of years. Thus, power generation costs begin to resemble capital
expenditures instead of fuel costs. Finally, although the fuel cost of nuclear power per
kilowatt is lower than the cost of fossil fuel, capital costs to build the facility and bring it on
line are higher. Thus, under an FAC, the high capital cost and lower fuel costs of nuclear
plants may create incentives to build fossil fuel plants even though overall costs of operat-
ing nuclear plants are lower. 1975 PUCO Report, supra note 13, at 1-2 app. D.
As of 1978, PUCO ruled that nuclear fuel and the associated nuclear fuel costs of burn-
up fraction of mining, enrichment, milling, fabrication, delivery costs, and carrying costs
not capitalized were includable. Office of the Consumers' Counsel of the State of Ohio,
Ohio Fuel Adjustment Clause Update Review (April 1979), at I-I.
144. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-01(C)(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
For an explanation of the formula concerning target thermal efficiency, see note 61 supra.
145. Id §4901:1-11-01(C)(I).
146. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 153.
147. Id at 155.
148. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901.1-11-01(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980);
NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 156. Target thermal efficiency is one of several perform-
ance measurement techniques, ranging in scope and sophistication, which assess static or
dynamic efficiency. TTE is called a partial factor productivity measure because only one
factor or input is selected for measurement. Partial factor productivity measures are
designed to produce a ratio with output as the numerator and input as the denominator.
Both absolute ratio and change over time can be evaluated by this method.
Other performance measures are total factor productivity, rates of incidence of techno-
logical adoption and diffusion, econometric modeling, and management audits. R. STE-
VENSON, supra note 98, at 205.
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PUCO constructed a formula14 9 which established a target
thermal efficiency (TTE) for each electric utility, based on that
utility's average monthly thermal efficiencies for a reference
year.' 50 TTE was then compared to the utility's actual thermal
efficiency, which was measured by the weighted average thermal
efficiency (WATE) achieved during each month of the preceding
year. 15 1  Both the TTE and WATE were expressed in
KWTT/mmBTU. Thus, actual thermal efficiency (WATE) di-
vided by TTE represented an operating efficiency ratio for the en-
tire system. If the actual thermal efficiency fell short of the target,
that is, if the operating efficiency ratio was less than one, then al-
lowable fuel costs were multiplied by that ratio and the company
was penalized in that increased fuel costs resulting from reduced
efficiency could not be passed on automatically to the con-
sumer. 1
52
The TTE could be raised or lowered during the utility's semi-
annual hearing, or at any time a requisite change in circumstances
had occurred.' 53 The proper TTE was a frequently contested is-
sue under Ohio's FAC, with the utilities invariably requesting a
lower target. The TTE could be adjusted by the Commission on
the basis of anticipated addition to or retirement of major generat-
ing facilities, or any other factors which it deemed proper.154 Typ-
ically, a company consistently falling short of its target would
request a lower target on the basis of normal load growth requir-
ing the use of less efficient peaking units. The Commission was
often persuaded by these requests.' 55




152. Id § 4901:1-11-01(A). The penalties assessed for failure to meet the target have
not been particularly severe. In 1977, the total includable fuel cost was $1.67 billion for the
eight utilities and $4.2 million was lost in penalties. Touche Ross Study, supra note 92, at
1-14.
153. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-04(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
Requisite change in circumstances was defined as that which may preclude the utility from
operating with "optimum dispatch." Ad § 4901:1-11-04(A)(3). In turn, "optimum dis-
patch" was defined as the operation of the electric utility's system at minimum overall
costs. Id § 4901:1-11-02(0).
154. Id § 4901:1-11-02(S).
155. For example, TTE was lowered in the following hearings: Dayton Power & Light
Co., No. 78-623-EL-FAC (Subfile A) 6 (PUCO, Apr. 11, 1979); Cincinnati Gas & Elec.
Co., No. 78-624-EL-FAC (Subfile A) 3 (PUCO, Mar. 20, 1979); Columbus & S. Ohio
Elec. Co., No. 78-627-EL-FAC 7 (PUCO, Jan. 10, 1979); Dayton Power & Light Co., No.
78-623-EL-FAC 6 (PUCO, Oct. 25, 1978); Ohio Edison Co., No. 78-622-EL-FAC 4
(PUCO, Oct. 18, 1978); Ohio Power Co., No. 77-380-EL-FAC (Subfile A) 5 (PUCO, Aug.
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It is debatable whether TTE actually provided any incentive
for efficient use and procurement of fuel. One basic weakness is
that once the Commission establishes a target thermal efficiency
for a utility, the company has no incentive to exceed its target. No
benefits accrue to a company that exceeds its target, and in fact, a
company may be penalized for so doing. Since target thermal effi-
ciency is based on past performance, a consistently superior show-
ing may induce PUCO to increase the target. 156 Thus, if a
company is comfortable with its target, knowing it can easily
achieve a ratio of one, there is little incentive to increase effi-
ciency. Consequently, as might be predicted, Ohio's eight compa-
nies have generally performed at initially established levels of
efficiency. 157
An additional important criticism of a target thermal efficiency
approach is that TTE may not always be consistent with economic
efficiency.15  In effect, TTE sometimes conflicts with the basic
policy behind the FAC: that the electric companies shall attempt
to operate at a minimum overall cost.'59 For example, the exclu-
sive use of expensive high grade coal will result in the most ther-
mally efficient method for generating kilowatt hours (KWH).
However, such a fuel mix may not provide the least costly method
of generating electricity. Alternatively, the use of a mix of high.
grade and low grade coal, although less thermally efficient, may
reduce fuel costs to such a degree that the production of KWH is
less costly. Moreover, system operations cannot always be con-
ducted by using the most efficient generating units, particularly
when demand increases. Thus, thermal efficiency and fuel cost
should be considered together to achieve an overall minimum cost
to generate electricity, even though this may result in less than
maximum thermal efficiency.
Both company and consumer groups have joined in the criti-
cism of TTE160 and these criticisms appear well founded. Unfor-
16, 1978); Dayton Power & Light Co., No. 77-374-EL-FAC 4 (PUCO, Apr. 12, 1978).
Monongahela Power Co., No. 77-376-EL-FAC (Subfile A) 6 (PUCO, Apr. 5. 1978);
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 77-377-EL-FAC 6 (PUCO, Dec. 7, 1977); Monon-
gahela Power Co., No. 77-376-EL-FAC 6 (PUCO, Nov. 9, 1977); Dayton Power & Light
Co., No. 77-374-EL-FAC 8 (PUCO, Oct. 19, 1977); Cincinnatti Gas & Elec. Co., No.
77-375-EL-FAC 2 (PUCO, Oct. 12, 1977).
156. Touche Ross Study, supra note 92, at IV-19 to -24. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co., No. 76-532-EL-FAC (Subfile A) (PUCO, June 15, 1977).
157. Touche Ross Study, supra note 92, at IV-19 to -24.
158. Id at IV-6 to -7.
159. OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-01(F) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
160. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 77-377-EL-FAC 5 (PUCO, Dec. 7,
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tunately, neither the new hearing contingency format as adopted
in Ohio nor earlier legislative proposals specifically provided for
change in the system of inducing thermal efficiency. 16'
3. The Economic Purchase of Power
Inclusion of purchased power in the automatic FAC is often
considered an incentive to use low-cost sources of power.' 62
Purchased power is a substitute for that power which a utility or-
dinarily would generate itself.163 Without the ability to purchase
power from other companies, each utility would have to increase
its generating capacity to become self-sufficient and capable of
providing reliable service in times of peak demand and emer-
gency. This excess capacity would be wasted, however, when de-
mand is at normal levels. Hence, the ability to buy power from
another utility at a price less than the cost of self-generation is
clearly desirable from the standpoint of economic efficiency." 4
Although the Ohio statute did not specifically mention
purchased power as includable under the FAC, the Commission
adopted a purchased power provision under its rulemaking au-
thority to encourage electric utilities to use the least expensive
sources of power. 6  An electric company was permitted to re-
cover through the FAC fuel costs incurred in the generation of
electricity by another company. These costs were referred to as
1977); Ohio Edison Co., No. 76-533-EL-FAC 10 (PUCO, Nov. 22, 1976); Touche Ross
Study, supra note 92, at IV-7 to -27.
161. See Final Bill, supra note 18; Senate Version, supra note 102; Am. Sub. H.B. 21,
113th Ohio General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1979-80) (as passed by the House) [hereinafter
cited as House Version].
162. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 149-50.
163. Id Approximately 35 states permit the inclusion of purchased power costs in the
FAC. The scope of these costs vary from state to state. For example, some states, such as
Kansas, do not include demand or capacity charges in the purchased power recovery. For
an explanation of demand and capacity charges see note 165 infra. Missouri excludes the
cost of purchased power generated with oil. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 149.
Purchased power fuel costs accounted for $251,548,391 or 15.06% of fuel costs passed
through the Ohio FAC in 1977. Touche Ross Study, supra note 92, at 111-6.
164. Testimony of R. Harr, Dayton Power & Light Co., No. 76-536-EL-FAC (Subfile
A) (PUCO, Mar. 7, 1977).
165. OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 4901:1-11-01(D), (E), -02(l) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (re-
pealed 1980). The cost of purchased power included either a demand and energy charge or
only an energy charge. The energy charge included allowable fuel and fuel-related costs.
When a demand charge was included, the buyer was purchasing a certain amount of gener-
ating capacity from the seller for a specified period. By PUCO order, the total cost of
purchased power, including demand charges, could be placed in the fuel adjustment charge
if the cost was less than the cost of the buyer's own generation. Cleveland Elec. Illuminat-
ing Co., No. 76-166-EL-FAC 14-17 (PUCO, Aug. 11, 1976).
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purchased power costs but actually represented only the costs of
fuel used to generate that electricity. Accordingly, the selling
company was required to exclude these same costs from its fuel
adjustment so these costs were not included twice. 166 Thus, the
fuel costs were recovered from customers of the purchasing utility,
that is, those for whom the electricity was generated, rather than
from the customers of the selling utility. As a further means of
encouraging economic efficiency, PUCO allowed the purchasing
company to recover through the FAC the entire cost of purchased
power rather than merely its fuel component if the purchasing
company bought electricity on an "economic dispatch basis."167
This term included all purchases of energy by a utility at a total
cost below the incremental cost of fuel needed to generate an
equivalent amount of energy on its own system.168
PUCO's authority to include purchased power by rule was
contested in Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utiliy Commission.169
The Office of Consumers' Counsel argued that it was not within
PUCO's rulemaking authority to permit the pass-through of
purchased power which is neither an acquisition nor a delivery
cost. 170
The court rejected the O.C.C.'s position, stating that costs of
fuel do not cease to exist on sales of power, but are incorporated
in the price paid for electricity. The ultimate consumer, receiving
the benefit of power purchases, is in effect charged for the acquisi-
tion and delivery costs of the generating company. Thus, the
166. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-01(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980). In
Ohio Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 54 Ohio St. 2d 342, 376 N.E.2d 1337 (1978), the
Commission had ordered the company to refund over $9.5 million, the amount of Ohio
Power's fuel cost in generating power for resale. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court up-
held the Commission's decision stating that the FAC could not be used as carte blanche
authorization to pass through to tariff customers expenses other than fuel costs fairly attrib-
utable to the production of services to those customers. The court found that it was not
unreasonable to order a refund on a finding that "fuel adjustment charges to its customers
included fuel costs incurred to produce power sold to other utilities which had already been
fully recovered under contracts under the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission."
Id at 344-45, 376 N.E.2d at 1338-39.
167. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4901:1-11-02 (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (repealed 1980).
168. Id
169. 56 Ohio St. 2d 319, 384 N.E.2d 245 (1978).
170. O.C.C. arguments were based on statutory construction. It contended that by im-
plication PUCO was prohibited from promulgating its purchase power provisions due to
the absence of the term purchase power cost in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.01(C), (E),
(F), (Page 1977) (amended 1980), which defined delivery cost, acquisition cost, and fuel
adjustment clause. Thus, § 4905.69(C), directing the Commission to establish incentives
"in terms of costs" did not give it authority to provide for purchased power. 56 Ohio St. 2d
at 322, 384 N.E.2d at 247.
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court permitted the inclusion of these costs in the FAC of the
purchasing utility, which through a chain of transactions was ac-
tually absorbing these costs.
17 1
As for the pass-through of the entire purchased power cost
under conditions of economic dispatch, the court found it difficult
to conceive of a method which would encourage a more efficient
fuel procurement practice, especially when the net effect was to
lower electricity costs to the consumer.'72 The court found this
inducement for efficiency clearly within the Commission's author-
ity under the language of the statute.1 73
There is little question that the economic purchase of power
among utilities is beneficial to the ultimate consumer and should
be encouraged within a proper administrative framework. Ade-
quate administrative review here is essential since purchased
power transactions involve millions of dollars in split-second deci-
sions of utility dispatchers. In practice, administrative review of
purchased power transactions has to be extremely difficult. The
administrative review of monthly form ER4, on which a utility
reports its purchased power transactions, emphasizes the difficulty
of monitoring the complicated set of transactions which comprise
purchased power agreements.1 74 Supporting the pass-through of
hundreds of millions of dollars, these ER4 forms have a history
of questionable uniformity, accuracy, and authenticity. For ex-
ample, substantial discrepancies reflecting different volume and
unit costs may appear on each company's ER-4 form.1 75 More-
over, the data on these forms, assuming uniformity, is almost im-
possible to verify because of difficulty in reconstructing old
171. Id at 321-22, 384 N.E.2d at 247.
172. Id at 323, 384 N.E.2d at 248.
173. Id at 323-24, 384 N.E.2d at 248.
174. The use of the ER-4 forms has been attacked by the O.C.C. It maintains that
utility company reporting on ER-4 forms has been unreliable, unintelligible, and incom-
plete, containing data which is neither uniform nor accurate. See, e.g., Columbus & S.
Ohio Elec. Co., No. 77-318-EL-FAC (Subfile A) 7-8 (PUCO, May 3, 1978).
175. Some of the difficulties of reporting on ER-4 forms appeared in Cincinnati Gas &
Elec. Co., No. 78-624-EL-FAC 9 (PUCO, Oct. 25, 1978).
During the hearing much time was spent trying to reconcile what appeared to be
differences between reports of sales and purchases of power by CG&E. The dis-
crepancies were resolved when it was determined that "wheeling" transactions
were considered neither purchases nor sales by CG&E and hence the Company
did not report them. Other surrounding utilities, notably DP&L and Ohio Power,
do consider these transactions as purchases and sales and do report them to the
Commission as either sales to or purchases from CG&E.
Id at 9. The company was ordered to revise its reports so the Commission could identify
wheeling. Id
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transactions to determine whether the purchaser made the proper
decision. 76 These problems are likely to continue under Ohio's
new format.
IV. THE OHIO HEARING CONTINGENCY FORMAT
Presently, state legislatures and commissions appear to be
moving away from the automatic FAC and toward adoption of a
hearing contingency format.'77 In addition, recent federal legisla-
tion has established guidelines for the restructuring of state
FAC's.'78 Following this trend, the Ohio General Assembly has
recently passed House Bill 21,1"9 a measure which adopts the
hearing contingency format in an effort to correct some of the de-
fects in the prior system.
Current changes in the economy suggest that the time is right
for states to consider discontinuation of FAC's in their present
form. Studies indicate that the coal market has become more sta-
ble and that the rapid increases in coal prices of the early 1970's
are now leveling off.'1 0 Indications are that the price of coal over
the next several years will only increase at the rate of inflation.' 8 '
The utilities have nevertheless argued that bond ratings for
Ohio utilities remain low and that the automatic FAC is still
needed to bolster the financial health of the industry. 8 2 But rising
176. For example, in its January, 1978, ER-4 form Cleveland Electric Illuminating re-
ported buying 10,374,000 kilowatt hours as an emergency purchase from Toledo Edison.
The corresponding ER-4 form for Toledo Edison reported selling only 77,000 kilowatt
hours to CEI at a lower unit cost. Post-Hearing Brief of the Consumers' Counsel at 16,
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 77-377-EL-FAC (Subfile A) (April 21, 1978).
Other states have had similar difficulties with purchased power. Illinois Power Co., 21
P.U.R.4th 416, 424-25 (11. Commerce Comm'n 1977). The Michigan Public Service Com-
mission requires supporting data prior to the pass-through of purchased power and in-
terchange costs. Detroit Edison Co., 14 P.U.R.4th 223, 264 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976).
177. See note 77 supra.
178. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1978), is
generally a conservation measure which includes noncompulsory guidelines for the admin-
istration of FAC's.
179. Final Bill, supra note 18.
180. Battelle Report, supra note 103, at IV-14 to -18; Dreese, sura note 5, at 1-10.
The Dreese study reported that, regardless of the trend in oil prices, fuel costs will probably
stabilize over the next few years as they did following the 1973 United Mine Workers
strike. It also noted that Ohio utilities have requested a rate increase approximately every
17 months. With semiannual FAC hearings, the study concluded that there is somejusti-
fication for combining general rate hearings with FAC hearings to avoid costly and dupli-
cate hearings irrespective of the size and pattern of fuel costs. Id
181. Battelle Report, supra note 103, at I-8.
182. Hearings Before the Energy and Public Utilities Comn, Ohio Senate, Mar. 21,
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fuel costs are not the only factors taken into account by rating
agencies. Perhaps even more important are nonfinancial criteria
such as company management, effective income tax rates, fuel
sources, and fuel mix.' 8 It may well be that some Ohio utilities
have a cash flow problem that is ameliorated by the FAC but is
not directly caused by increases in the cost of fuel.' 84 Although
Ohio utilities have been derated since 1973, slow economic growth
in Ohio resulting in declining sales may be at least as responsible
as the cost of fuel.' 85 To continue the use of the automatic FAC
under these circumstances would be a perversion of the FAC's
purpose.
In 1975, when House Bill 579 was passed, regulatory lag in
Ohio was considered to be among the longest in the country.'8 6
Today, however, regulatory lag has been greatly reduced and is no
longer a major reason for maintaining the automatic pass-through
of fuel costs.' 87 Today there is greater public sensitivity to the
automatic pass-through of fuel costs and, as this Article has sug-
gested, it is now believed that the quick and easy recovery of fuel
costs in Ohio often reduces a company's incentive for efficient
management and discourages hard bargaining in fuel contract ne-
gotiations.
The above concerns undoubtedly led the Ohio legislature to
adopt an interim hearing contingency procedure to replace the au-
tomatic FAC. House Bill 21, as initially passed by the House,'
was a comprehensive reform of fuel cost adjustment procedures;
the final bill'89 is somewhat weaker and generally lessens the bur-
dens on the electric companies.
House Bill 21 was signed into law by Governor Rhodes on
April 2, 1980, and became effective ninety days later on July 2,
1979 (statement of C. Seligson). All of Ohio's electric companies, except for Ohio Power
and Columbus & Southern, have been derated once by Moody's Bond Survey. Id at 5.
The ratings, however, have remained stable since the initial deratings in 1973-1974.
183. See generally Moody's Bond Survey; Standard and Poor's Industry Survey, Utili-
ties-Electric, Mar. 22, 1979.
184. Dreese, supra note 5, at 10.
185. Id
186. Goodman, supra note 92, at 219. Regulatory lag was, on the average, twenty-two
months. The Ohio General Assembly revised ratemaking procedures with the enactment
of Amended Substitute Senate Bill 94, putting a 275-day deadline on rate increase deci-
sions from PUCO. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4909.42 (Page 1977) (amended 1980).
187. NARUC Study, supra note 24, at 191.
188. House Version, supra note 161.
189. Final Bill, supra note 18.
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1980.19 ° Although the Bill' 91 is a substantial reform of the for-
merly existing method of fuel cost adjustment, the companies will
not be greatly burdened by its provisions.
The hearing contingency format eliminates the immediate
pass-through of fuel costs. 192 Although these costs will continue
to be considered separately from the general rate hearing, semian-
nual review must occur before the company passes through any
fuel costs appearing on a customer's bill.193 Of course, eliminating
the automatic fuel cost adjustment by deferring recovery for six
months will probably not reduce rates, but consumers' bills will
become somewhat more predictible, varying semiannually rather
than fluctuating monthly.
Unlike the automatic FAC, House Bill 21 defines the fuel
component as the acquisition and delivery costs in the generation
of electricity, including the allowable costs of purchased power,
divided by the corresponding number of net kilowatt hours gener-
ated and purchased.194 Only average historical costs are consid-
ered, preventing companies from using projected fuel costs which
would have led to systematic overstatement of future fuel costs.1
95
Clearly, the adoption of average historical costs is an essential fea-
ture of a hearing contingency FAC. Otherwise, use of projected
costs would create a similar or perhaps even greater distortion
than the automatic FAC.
Although the hearing contingency format is designed to review
fuel costs semiannually, the Commission can expedite the hearing
if changes in system operating characteristics or acquisition and
delivery costs cause or may be reasonably anticipated to cause a
twenty percent increase in the fuel component.196 This will permit
a more frequent adjustment of the fuel component in times of un-
controllable inflation to maintain the financial integrity of the util-
ities. In addition, the twenty percent threshold will keep PUCO
insulated from frivolous demands for expedited hearings. This
provision of House Bill 21, however, has a potential for abuse.
For example, a company facing a fifteen percent jump in fuel
costs-not enough to trigger the hearing-may waste another five
190. The Plain Dealer, Apr. 3, 1980, at 15-A, col. 1.
191. Final Bill, supra note 18.
192. See notes 177-89 supra and accompanying text.
193. Final Bill, supra note 18, at § 4905.301.
194. Id. § 4905.01(G).
195. Id. § 4905.01(H).
196. Final Bill, supra note 18, at § 4905.301.
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percent or bargain less actively for fuel to meet the twenty percent
requirements for an expedited hearing.
As a result of lobbying efforts by the electric companies, two
important changes in the definition of acquisition costs appear in
House Bill 21. Unlike the provisions under the automatic FAC,
the cost of washing coal when required by law or rule is added to
the definition of acquisition cost. 197 These coal washing costs can
now be considered every six months rather than postponed until
the general rate hearing. Second, House Bill 21, unlike the previ-
ous statute, requires the Commission to determine if a captive coal
price is reasonable when compared to similar transactions with
independent mining operations. 198 An earlier version of the Bill
contained a provision unpopular with the electric companies,
which specified that the contract term could not exceed ten per-
cent of the average cost for contracts with independent mining op-
erations. 199 House Bill 21 has deleted the ten percent criterion,
substituting a point of view more sympathetic to the companies.
Accordingly, PUCO in addition to comparing the cost of the affili-
ated transaction with nonaffiliated transactions must also consider
trends in the mining industry, long-term dependability, and the
reliable energy supply interests of its customers. 20 0 Thus, the com-
panies have persuasively argued that dependability and reliability
of coal supply are just as important as contract price in determin-
ing whether a captive coal transaction is reasonable. This stan-
dard, comprehensible and reasonable in theory, will be difficult to
administer in practice because of the number of variables which
do not lend themselves to easy measurement. The better ap-
proach, as suggested by the O.C.C., would be to place a ceiling on
the costs of captive coal that could be charged to consumers under
the interim adjustment with any other costs considered at the gen-
eral rate hearing. 0 1
Unlike the system under the automatic FAC, purchased power
is specifically allowed by House Bill 2 1.202 The new Bill codifies
the principle of economic efficiency as adopted by PUCO and up-
held by the courts. 20 3 The Bill provides that no costs of purchased
197. Id. § 4905.01(F)(2).
198. Id. § 4905.01(F).
199. House Version, supra note 161, at § 4905.01(F).
200. Final Bill, supra note 18, at § 4905.01(F)(1).
201. Hearing on Sub. H.B. 21 Before the Public Utilities Comm., Ohio H.R., June 12,
1979.
202. Final Bill, supra note 18, at § 4909.159(B).
203. See notes 162-76 supra and accompanying text.
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power exceeding acquisition and delivery costs of the fuel used in
its generation be allowed, unless the cost per kilowatt hours of
purchased power did not exceed the reasonably anticipated incre-
mental cost of self-generated power which could have been substi-
tuted for the purchased power.2" Other charges, such as
nonmonetary exchanges, are specifically excluded. 05 In short, the
Bill has codified the current position on purchased power which
has generated much controversy and will continue to do so.
The question remains whether the semiannual hearing contin-
gency format under House Bill 21 will lead to better administra-
tion of the FAC. As for basic monitoring and review procedures,
House Bill 21 retains most of the safeguards found under the au-
tomatic FAC. Electric companies are required to submit al perti-
nent data thirty days prior to the semiannual hearing20 6 and the
burden is on the company throughout the hearing to prove that its
expenses are reasonable °.2 7 PUCO is also required to make an-
nual inspections of all businesses furnishing fuel to electric com-
panies and could subpoena pertinent information for this
purpose.2 8
As a further procedural protection, the Bill requires PUCO to
conduct or cause to be conducted, at least annually, an audit of
the utilities' fuel-related practices and to report its findings once a
year to the General Assembly. 09 The Bill, however, does not
specify that the audit be conducted by PUCO staff members, 210
Such a requirement would have avoided the appearance of any-
thing less than independence and would have provided objective
appraisal of management activities.2 1' On the other hand, to have
the PUCO staff conduct the audit would greatly increase the cost
of regulation. l A proposed amendment to House Bill 21, re-
ported out of the Senate Committee, allowed PUCO to hire the
auditing firm with the proviso that the firm was not presently con-
ducting, and had not within the previous two years conducted, a
financial audit of the company. 13 This provision would have re-
204. Final Bill, supra note 18, at § 4909.159(B).
205. Id. § 4909.159(A).
206. Id. § 4901.191(B).
207. Id. § 4901.191(C).
208. Id. § 4905.67(A).
209. Id. §§ 4905.66(B)(2), (3).
210. Id. § 4905.69.
211. See notes 96-101 supra and accompanying text.
212. Id.
213. Senate Version, supra note 102, at § 4905.66(B)(2).
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sponded to much of the criticism discussed earlier in this article.
Although this amendment was defeated on the floor and the origi-
nal version reinstated, 214 it should serve as a model for other
states-at the least, commissions should be required to choose the
auditing firm which would in turn be required to report directly to
the commission.
House Bill 21 directs the Commission to phase in the provi-
sions of the Bill within ninety days of the Bill's effective date.1 5
The Commission is also required to promulgate a rule implement-
ing these provisions which will replace at least in name the admin-
istrative rules under the automatic FAC. No great changes,
however, can be expected in administrative practice, given the
short time period in which to promulgate the rules. Moreover,
both the companies and the Commission are accustomed to cur-
rent practices, and many of the old rules can be extended to cover
the new format under House Bill 21. The basic reporting require-
ments will undoubtedly be much the same, probably raising the
same questions about purchased power transactions that existed
under the automatic FAC.21 6 It remains an open question
whether PUCO will retain its target thermal efficiency or develop
some new mode for inducing the efficient use and procurement of
fuel. Because target thermal efficiency has been criticized by both
company and consumer groups, perhaps PUCO will decide to
keep target thermal efficiency as a yardstick for measuring a com-
pany's overall results but will no longer impose penalties for fail-
ure to meet the target.21 7 The controversy over the proper means
to encourage efficiency will no doubt continue.
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come to revaluate the automatic FAC. In times
of volatile coal prices, the automatic fuel adjustment clause may
have been a valuable device in preventing the erosion of the elec-
tric companies' financial position, but with the stabilization of the
price of coal, it is appropriate to reassess the automatic FAC as it
is administered and applied under current state systems. Enact-
ment of Ohio's House Bill 21 is the correct direction in which to
proceed, as the bill cuts back somewhat on the scope of includable
fuel costs, makes fuel cost increases less frequent and more diffi-
214. Final Bill, supra note 18, at § 4905.66(B)(2).
215. Id. § 4905.69.
216. See notes 162-76 supra and accompanying text.
217. See notes 144-61 supra and accompanying text.
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cult, and generally tightens standards of verification and monitor-
ing.
Still, the interim format is a compromise position between
complete abolition and automatic pass-through. Because it iso-
lates one component for review on a semiannual basis, it has been
criticized for the same reasons as the automatic FAC.2" 8 Nonethe-
less, even though the format runs the same risks of encouraging
economic inefficiency, these tendencies should be less pro-
nounced. Moreover, studies have shown that the inefficiency in-
duced by the automatic FAC may be curtailed under more
rigorous commission review and monitoring of fuel use and pro-
curement practices.2 19
The problem of regulatory lag will not be as acute in the in-
terim hearing format as it would become with total abolition,
where fuel cost questions would only be considered in the general
rate-making hearing. The difficult question whether an optimum
lag time will be created by this interim system remains. In other
words, does the six-month interim provision create a situaton
where the marginal cost of more delay exceeds the marginal bene-
fit of the efficiency incentives created by the delay?
Finally, consumer groups which have banked on lower electric
rates as a result of the abolishment of the automatic FAC will no
doubt be disappointed. Rates will not fluctuate as much, but
neither will they be lower, as essentially the same costs of produc-
ing electricity will be reflected in consumer rates.
Despite the admitted inadequacies of an interim format, it is
clear that automatic fuel adjustment should not become a perma-
nent feature of the regulatory process except in those times (such
as the years immediately following 1974) when fuel costs are ex-
tremely volatile in nature, are beyond the control of the electric
companies, and present a, serious threat to the financial integrity
218. Thus, even interim rate adjustments, based on some-but not all--costs of an elec-
tric utility, may be biased to register changes in those cost elements most vulnerable to
increase without taking into account offsetting cost reductions such as productivity im-
provement. Similarly, interim adjustments may tend to weaken incentives for efficiency, in
that management has less incentive to minimize costs than when the benefits of efficiency
accrue to the shareholders. The interim adjustment may also distort the incentive for a
utility to select the most efficient combination of inputs to generate electricity. See gener-
ally J.W. Wilson and Associates Inc., Automatic and Discretionary Adjustment Procedures
for Electric Utility Rates, A Report to the Experimental Technology Incentives Program,
National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, March 1979. For a discus-
sion of the failings of the automatic FAC, see notes 31-53 supra and accompanying text.
219. See note 53 supra.
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of the utilities. Today this problem is no longer present with the
same exigency. Thus, the automatic FAC should not be viewed as
a sacred, unchangeable aspect of the regulatory process, but as an
unusual emergency measure designed to avoid grave but tempo-
rary consequences.
